achieved the title to be a poet. That is the opinion of the Dwanyaloka also when it says काव्यकोपिनायकः शोकः कौशलमातः (1.5.) and त्या वाक्योत्सनायांकृपितः स्विनिस्थापनायायिरत्वात्सनायामितः शोकः एव श्रोतयाय परिस्तः (शिन्ते thereon).

15. Of course the Dwanyaloka says that it is an instance of Vyanyya being the essence of poetry. What ever may be the name, if things or situations are presented in their truly Natural aspect that is to say with a focus on their central principle of 'inward harmony of coherence' that would be Swabhavokti, the primary Alankara and is apt to give 'Relish' to the sense. It has been already shown that for Dandi, the term Alankara has a very wide connotation, it may be anything that adds beauty to a poetic piece (2.1). That is why it could say गतोलकमः महतेजः शालीन्द्र: नेत्रोदयति इत्यादि: (2.244) though Bhamaha is not for accepting such at all. This is not difficult for one who has asserted that Swabhavokti is the primary alankara as these also are a species of that genus. They may not be expressive of any other alankara, do not contain any vakrokti, but still they may conjure various exquisite ideas in proper contexts, and in that way they may be the best of poetry. So it is that Mammata says अपितु काव्योऽवर्ते महतेजः सङ्कोऽपर्यत्कर्पे: प्रति एकः एवं च निमोतिषः। (भक्ति 3.5) महतेजः प्राणायामातः स्वरूपसातारः स्वरूपायामातः (भक्ति 3.244).

The style of Patañjali, as recorded in the Mahābhāṣya is unique in its lucidity and clarity. The Bhāṣya is rightly reckoned as अध्वर्याकাশः ग्राम्योऽध्वर्याय इव लोकः (वैक्यपादिकं 2/485). Commenting on this verse, Punyaräsaja observes the characteristic, due to which the Bhāṣya is designated as Mahābhāṣya. He defined ग्राम्योऽध्वर्याय इव लोकः, प्रेमाद्वर्याय इव लोकः, प्रेमाद्वर्याय इव लोकः, प्रेमाद्वर्याय इव लोकः (वैक्यपादिकं 2/486).

The statement that the expressions of Patañjali are difficult to understand is quite justified. Frequently, we come across such sentences in the Bhāṣya which, at first appear as incorrect or inaccurate, but after a close study it becomes clear that the proposition is though peculiar in form yet its import is quite logical. There is no doubt that in some places, we cannot, at the present state of our knowledge, justify Patañjali so far as the peculiar structure of many sentences of the Bhāṣya is concerned and we also do not hesitate to state that there are some propositions in the Bhāṣya, which we cannot at present accept as quite faultless. Either we are to accept that we have not as yet arrived at the real import of those sentences or such expressions were common at the time of Patañjali.

In the following pages, we will take up some peculiar sentences of the Bhāṣya and try to discuss how far they are correct. The style of Patañjali, which is the main cause of such peculiarities, will also be discussed through these passages. To make brevity, only a few instances will be taken up for consideration, though such cases may be various in number in the entire body of the Bhāṣya. We invite scholars to think over these points so that the actual character of Patañjali's style would come in light.

(A) It is a peculiar style of Patañjali that he often uses such terms, which do not convey the sense desired by him. In the
Bhāṣya of the Śūtra 3/3/26) a question is raised as to whether the term योग्य: which was asked for. But as a matter of fact, Patañjali's intention is to ask the sense of ते (4/13) as is shown by Kaiyata. Again on Śūtra 3/1/1/26 Patañjali used the sentence ते नेत्रायाम अनुप्राणित: योग्य: and here the term ते is not necessarily mean योग्य: but he uses the term ते.

As to what is the reason for such an anomaly Nāgēśa offered the explanation as no ते can be sanctioned by two Śūtras, so ते: would necessarily mean योग्य: ज्ञाता. Like Pāṇini, Patañjali was also fond of brevity and such peculiar expressions are the results of it. As to the reason for the first instance it can be said that here ते would necessarily indicate हेतु: for there is no necessity to ask ते in this Śūtra. But this does not mean that such expressions are to be imitated. We think that such expressions were commonly used by grammarians at the time of Patañjali and so he did not find any fault in uttering ते: though his intention was in हेतु:.

(B) There are such expressions which were current in the time of Patañjali to convey the desired sense, but at present they came in disuse. In the Bhāṣya of the śūtra 3/1/2 Patañjali said संवकित: ते किं प्रकार? Here his intention is to know the connotation of the term संवकित: and as such the proper question would be ते किं प्रकार? We think that ते in the place of किं प्रकार? was an idiom of that time though at present such expressions are not used.

Other example of this type is the use of the finite verb तत्सत्तपित: in the sense of यथाचारायमित: In many places Patañjali used the verb तत्सत्तपित: but the desired fact had not been said afterwards in the Bhāṣya and thus the commentators became compelled to explain it as यथाचारायमित: (vide Pradipa 2/3/66, 8/3/7 etc.) It can also be conceived that the word तत्सत्तपित: denoted the sense of यथाचारायमित: in the time of Patañjali and so the use of this term in the said cases is quite justified.

In some places Patañjali uttered only a portion (अदृश्य:) of a desired proposition, which causes confusion, though through the power of the context, commentators showed the whole proposition as desired by Patañjali. As for example we find an objection as कथित: इत्यत्तपित: अत्यद्वृत्तिः प्रकरण: काविकृत: तत्सत्तपित: ज्ञाता: which was refuted by Patañjali saying तत्सत्तपित: नियमम तत्सत्तपित: and Here the word ते indicates the Śūtra तत्सत्तपित: (4/1/92).

(C) There are very few expressions in the Bhāṣya, which are not to be taken in their own verbal form, but they indicate some other words, similar to them. We cannot understand why Patañjali used such analogous words, for it is quite possible that such words may create misunderstanding.

An instance of such expressions is found in the Bhāṣya of Śūtra 3/3/27. The reading is—किं प्रकार? ते किं प्रकार? न किं प्रकार? अनोद्यत: प्रकार: Now as a matter of fact there can be no operation of किं प्रकार? in the case in question. As to why such a statement is made, Nāgēśa offered the following explanation—संवकित: ज्ञाता: प्रकार: प्रकार: नियमम तत्सत्तपित: (Uddyota) i.e., Patañjali meant किं प्रकार? though he uttered किं प्रकार?

Such examples may also be seen in the Bhāṣya of the Śūtra 3/4/4. Here Patañjali says that in the word ते the suffix ते will be operated by the Śūtra तत्सत्तपित: (4/1/63). But this is not correct, and as a matter of fact ते will be operated according to the Śūtra 3/4/6 (4/1/64) to which the term ते: of the Śūtra 4/1/63 is related, as is shown by Kaiyata.

(D) Similarly we find that Patañjali uttered some words which are not fruitful in that particular place but are stated due to the fact that such a statement was used in a foregoing place. Patañjali was very fond of using words, which were used previously and the same example is given again and again to illustrate the same principle. Perhaps such an instinct was the cause of the aforesaid fault also.

In the Bhāṣya of Śūtra 1/4/4, Patañjali said तत्सत्तपित: अवधिमाणिकोपायम् काविकृत: किं प्रकार? ज्ञाता: प्रकार: नियमम (4/1/64) and so the whole compound is reproduced here without paying any heed to the fruitfulness of each word of the compound ते किं प्रकार? रुपमेव साधनमिति इत्यादि (4/1/64)
In many places, Patañjali quoted the Sūtras of Pāṇini for various purposes. In the process of quoting the Sūtras, it is his common style that he utters the whole Sūtra. But in some places, only a portion of the Sūtra is uttered. As for example Patañjali said uttara śāti कृत्ये, प्राकृते उदाहरण: यथा (3/8/107). Here the desired Sūtra is stated in a few words but cannot be uttered in full. It was stated: (3/3/96) and it is not a case of variant at all.

As to why Patañjali uttered in such a manner, it can be replied that in such cases, there was no necessity of quoting the whole Sūtra and so a part of the Sūtra is recalled. His intention was to indicate the Sūtra, in which the term उदाहरण exists, and so he uttered some words of the Sūtra which were attached to the term उदाहरण. It should not be deemed that it is a variant.

In many cases Patañjali had to quote more than one Sūtra for any grammatical operation. In such cases we generally find that he quoted them according to the order of the Sūtras. But there are some cases where he uttered the Sūtras without paying any heed to their original order. As for example we can take up the statement इसे कस्मिन् न भवति? को? कृत्ये प्रसिद्धिः? (1/1/1). This shows that the Sūtra यो: by itself is read after the Sūtra प्रसिद्धिः, but as a matter of fact (8/1/16) is read at first and the यो: by itself (8/2/30). It is not an anomaly. The fact is that Patañjali meant to say that the Sūtra यो: will not be operated in the word अपरेतम्, which is under the province of प्रसिद्धिः. In fact यो: is sufficient for the purpose, but the Sūtra प्रसिद्धिः is again said to denote that the word अपरेतम् is in a प्रसिद्धि and so the Sūtra यो: is to be applied for it is under the Sūtra प्रसिद्धिः ते. प्रसिद्धिः is used to sanction the ground for the operation of the Sūtra यो: योः. Thus it is clear that the utterance of two Sūtras violating their order is not an anomaly.

Sometimes Patañjali, instead of quoting the Sūtras, showed the sense of the Sūtras, as अभिनव हि विभाजनोपधारी, तव त्यस्माद् प्राप्तवेद्विद्व वाक्यम् विभाजनोपधारी (3/1/26). Here Patañjali’s intention was to place the Sūtras, in which विभाजनोपधारी is used and as such he should have shown the examples as अभिनवहि विभाजनोपधारी (5/2/37) and विभाजनोपधारी (4/1/3), but instead of quoting these two Sūtras, he showed their sense.

Similarly we find sometimes he placed some of the Sūtras at one place consecutively, though their order is not the same. Thus we find that he began the Bhāṣya on Sūtra सम. श्रेय (8/3/5); after mentioning two other Sūtras viz. द्रव्य (8/2/6) and चर्चा (8/3/12). As to why these Sūtras of different places are read at one place Kāyāta offered the explanation as द्रव्य विवेचनम् भावे विवेचनानि पद्धतिः (Pradīpa). In such case it cannot be conceived that the order of the Sūtras, as shown by Patañjali, is original or there has happened any disorder in the Sūtra order. We have achieved the Aṣṭādhyāyī in an utmost pure form and without any strong ground we can not say that there has happened any disorder in the Aṣṭādhyāyī.

(F) In some cases it is found that Patañjali taking shelter to a fallacious reason, solves any grammatical problem. Such cases are to be considered deeply for it is quite inconceivable that a teacher like Patañjali will accept a fallacious reason without any sufficient ground. And as a matter of fact such a style is accepted to show some hidden purpose. The Bhāṣya of the Sūtra नाम नाम (7/3/4) is an example of this tendency. Here Patañjali has accepted a fallacious ground and thereby he showed a hidden purpose as shown by Nāgāraja एवं न दुरास्थिति (7/3/4) is an example of this tendency. Here Patañjali has accepted a fallacious ground and thereby he showed a hidden purpose as shown by Nāgāraja एवं न दुरास्थिति (7/3/4).

In some cases Patañjali accepting a corrupt way, tries to defend or to raise a doubt. Such acceptance of a corrupt way is never to be deemed as correct but as Kāyāta says’ विभाजनोपधारी काव्यम् प्रत्यावर्धनाति (7/3/4). We also support this view otherwise there would be no foundation of any Sūtra.

(G) We have seen in some cases, that which was expressly said by Patañjali, was not his desired object. The same characteristic is found in the case of शोभितम् ज्ञातम्. Regarding some of the शोभितम् (as said by Patañjali) commentators say that Patañjali showed a way to शोभितम् and the said शोभितम् is merely a शोभितम्विशेष (vide Uddyota on 7/1/59).

Such a tendency is common in giving the उदाहरण also. There are some examples (given by Patañjali), which are not actual examples, but they show the way for exact examples. Thus we find that Patañjali has given the example of the Sūtra एवं श्रव्यस्य (8/1/9) as एव श्रव्यस्य. But Kāyāta showed that this is not the proper example and this example only shows how an example can be conceived as एव उदाहरणाय श्रव्यस्य (Pradīpa).
Patañjali uses a peculiar style to set forth an example in some Sūtras. It is to ask as विन्दरत्स्यार्यम्? The examples given after such questions are more valuable in comparison to other examples given in ordinary manner. In a forth coming paper we shall deal with such examples.

(H) Patañjali used some sentences, which are not familiar at present. Here some of such sentences are compiled. We will also show how they are justified.

(1) Patañjali said ‘त एव विद्वान्म्’ (Paspaśā). Now-a-days such a sentence is deemed as irregular, but at the time of Patañjali such usage was an idiom. Here the noun in the nominative case to the finite verb is श्रवण (which is understood) and ते is a विद्वान् प्रश्नकार्यम्, and thus the sentence means. We, thinking this fact will understand.

(2) Similarly he said ‘सर्वोस्माहेत्’. Patañjali meant to say बहुः मन्यामहेत् but he added the ‘ते’ (which is a विद्वान् प्रश्नकार्यम्) which means ‘we, following this principle, think’.

(3) There is a sentence in Paspaśā as ‘सदयं सर्वसंस्कार्य क पठवं?’. At present we are inclined to write it as श्रवण्या एवत्? Commentators say that Patañjali used the term ‘विद्वान्’ (instead of श्रवण) to denote that here the word अवे would mean अशिल्भ (connotation) and not necessity.

(4) In the Bh. of the Sūtra श्रवण्यासंस्कार्यम् we find the sentence प्रकुर्णामेवं स प्रकृतमति (6/17/17) i.e., the word श्रवण्यासंस्कार्य is present in the former two Sūtras and is related to the Sūtra 6/17. But as a matter of fact we find no such term in the preceding Sūtras. Explanation for this anomaly is given by नागेशा that here the words of the foregoing two Sūtras are desired and they are related to this Sūtra, and this relation of words is called as श्रवण्यासंस्कार्यम्, ष्ट्रवण्यासंस्कार्यम्, ष्ट्रवण्यासंस्कार्यम् (Uddyota)

(5) Patañjali used the Nipāta अवे, which is not familiar at present. It means ‘for this reason’ as is shown in the Pradīpa of the Bhāṣya अवे शुद्धते (Paspaśā). Similarly he used the three Nipātas at one place as श्रवण त्वाहि (Paspaśā) and Patañjali showed the sense of नागेशा श्रवण्यासंस्कार्यम् as श्रवण्यासंस्कार्यम् or नागेशा (Pradīpa 5/4/73).

(J) Like peculiar sentences, we find some peculiar words with their unfamiliar sense. Some examples are given under:

(1) In the Bhāṣya of the Sūtra 3/3/20, we find the word यहरण्या कालम् and Patañjali himself says कहे यहरण्या.
Patañjali’s opinion does not support the view. Thus we find that the conclusion of the Bhāṣya on Śūtra 8.3-17 (उत्तरेण सत्त्व अनुभवा कोनाम, हृद शोभन, इत्यादि यथायात), here Mahābhārataśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśासा, is asserted by Kaiyāta. Here the conclusion is not supported by the Bhāṣya on Śūtra and as such Nāgėśa says एवं चेत् आयः पूर्वाक्तेश्वरज्जिता (Uddyota).

In connection with the एकेणि and विद्वेष्टितम् this also should be known that in some cases, Patañjali accepted an opinion, which he refuses in another place. Thus we find that in the Bhāṣya of Śūtra 6.4-111 Patañjali refuted the बल्कम् of as तत्त्व in the Śūtra of श्रीतोरोग: (6.4-111), but in a later Śūtra he showed the ऐक्यावस्थितिः of तत्त्व. Thus it is clear that the real significance of the refutations of Patañjali should be judged after a deep study of the entire Mahābhāṣya.

Our present study proves that it is too difficult to ascertain which is the विद्वेष्टितम् or एकेणि after the aid given by all commentators. There are some propositions, which appear as proper विद्वेष्टितम् but commentators admirably showed that the same is not the ultimate conclusion. Thus we find that in the Bhāṣya of the Śūtra महोमेरुकर्त्व (7.1-23), Patañjali said at last as लक्य प्रकरणम् कालं which appears as the ultimate conclusion, but in fact Patañjali refuted the वार्तिकā लक्यम्, as shown by Nāgėśa. Even it becomes too much difficult to ascertain whether the refutation of Patañjali is to be accepted as valid or it is mere a बाद. Commentators showed that the apparent refutation is not the ultimate judgment of Patañjali (vide Uddyota on 7.1-40).

There are other peculiarities of the conclusive statements of Patañjali. In some place Patañjali has given the judgment according to the need of the critic or the character of the question. In such cases the division does neither at all solve the problem nor disclose the character of the thing asked for. These are also no doubt एकेणि मध्यम. A capital example of such judgment may be found in the Bhāṣya on Śūtra 4.1-112 (vide Uddyota-प्रकरणस्तु श्रवणम् मध्य मध्यमप्रकरणम् अनुभवार्थप्रकरणे दु:भूतेन उपन्यासार्थप्रकरणम् परिहारार्थप्रकरणम्, न तु श्रवणस्तु निर्दिष्टम्.

Besides these, there are many other peculiarities in the expressions of Patañjali. In a forthcoming paper we shall deal with these in future.

JAINISM IN PRE-HISTORIC INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION.

BY
ARYA RAMACHANDRA G. TIWARI, M.A., LL.B.,
Head of the Department of History & Politics, Prataṭh College, Amainer, E.K.

Some scholars have attempted to establish that Jainism as a religion existed amongst the people of the Indus Valley civilization. Late R. P. CHANDA was the first to advance this claim (‘Modern Review’, August 1932). He gave the following reasons for it:—

(a) There is similarity of pose between the standing image of Rśabhadeo in Curzon Museum of Archaeology, Mathura, and the standing deities on the Indus seals. But he himself admits that “the eyes of Rśabha, though half-shut, are not accurately shown as fixed on the tip of the nose” in the Mathura image. This is very fatal to his thesis because the gaze fixed on the tip of the nose is a special feature of the yogis on the Indus seals and the Indus statue, according to him;¹

(b) The sole to sole pose of the sitting ‘yog’s’ on the seals is the same Bhadraśana in which, according to the Jain legends, Mahāvira attained Kaivalahood. But some of the bent kneel sole to sole figures are now recognized to be that of Siva;²

(c) The presence of bull on seals, the symbol of Rśabhadeo in the of Jain iconography, is accepted by Chanda as the proof of the existence of Jainism.³ But bull is also the vehicle and the theriomorphic representative of Siva; and

(d) The standing Kāyostargsa pose on two seals, according to CHANDA, is peculiarly Jain.⁴ One of these seals (Pl. II Fig. (f)) shows in the upper register, from left

2. ibid., p. 188.
3. JACOB: Sacred Books of the East, XXII 263.
4. MARSHALL: Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Valley Civilisation, II. 55-56.
5. op. cit., p. 159.